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1 Introduction
In a contest or a tournament, rewards are based on the relative performance of the con-
testants. Contests serve two diﬀerent purposes. First, tournaments among workers can
mitigate incentive problems when the eﬀort of workers is unobservable. Second, tourna-
ments serve as a selection mechanism. For example, since employers do not necessarily
know which workers are the most able, promotions are often based on a comparison of the
observed productivity of the workers; the firm promotes the top-ranked worker.
In this paper we focus on the selection aspect of contests, in the case where risk taking
is the strategic variable of the contestants. Employees involved in a promotion process or
tenure process, for example, may choose tasks that diﬀer in risk profile to show oﬀ their
abilities. Or even simpler, the task may be fixed but employees choose between a ’safe’
working method (e.g., working thoroughly) and a ’risky’ working method (e.g., working
hastily).
We investigate the selection eﬃciency of contests in which the contestants optimize
their choice of risk, given the risk taking of others. Who will come out on top, bad types or
good types? In what way will the selection eﬃciency depend on, for example, the quality
of the contestant pool? We view answering such questions as important to understand
the eﬃciency of promotion processes in firms. Another example is the selection of fund
managers in financial markets. Empirical studies show that investors tend to select fund
managers with the highest rate of return previous year. Furthermore, these studies show
that competition for prospective investments has impact on fund managers’ risk taking
(Chevalier and Ellison (1997)).
Although the case where agents choose both risk and eﬀort seems realistic for many
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applications, we confine ourselves to the case where risk taking is the only strategic vari-
able. We focus on the selection eﬃciency of contests along two dimensions: the number of
contestants and the quality of the pool of contestants. Two natural conjectures are the fol-
lowing: Selection eﬃciency improves with the quality of the contestant pool, and selection
eﬃciency improves with the number of contestants. Tougher competition makes tougher
winners. Our two main results are negative; we show that, in our simple model, neither
conjectures necessarily holds true. In a separate section, we discuss whether introduction
of several prizes or several contests can solve the selection problem.
The model we work with has two types of agents, a low type and a high type, each
with two possible pure strategies, safe and risky. The risky strategy induces a (not
necessarily mean preserving) spread in the probability distribution of individual output
compared to the safe strategy. For a given risk level, the high type’s output dominates
the low type’s output.
We focus on what seems to be the most natural measure of selection eﬃciency of a
contest; the probability of a high type agent winning it. We denote this probability by Π.
We show that Π may decrease with a pool of agents of higher quality, i.e., an increase in
the share of high ability agents in the pool. To see the underlying intuition, notice that
increasing the quality of the pool has two eﬀects. The first is the statistical eﬀect: a higher
quality of the pool increases Π, holding the strategies of the types fixed. The second eﬀect
is the equilibrium eﬀect: increasing the quality of the pool shifts the equilibrium of the
game to one with increased risk taking. The latter eﬀect may decrease Π. Thus we show
that the statistical eﬀect’s positive influence on Π may be dominated by the equilibrium
eﬀect’s negative influence on Π. An implication is that a firm may discriminate against
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agents who are likely to be highly skilled by not allowing them to take part in the contest.1
A similar intuition can be applied to our discussion of the eﬀect on Π of increasing the
number of contestants, n. If n increases, the probability of a high type agent being included
in the contest increases (a positive statistical eﬀect). However, increasing the number of
contestants also implies more risk taking in equilibrium (the equilibrium eﬀect), which
may harm to selection eﬃciency. We show that the positive statistical eﬀect of increasing
the number of contestants may be weaker than the negative equilibrium eﬀect. Thus a
firm may improve selection eﬃciency by limiting competition for higher-rank positions.
Although it has often been argued that contests serve both motivation and selection
functions (see e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Schlicht (1988)), the tournament literature
has mostly focused on the case with homogenous agents, where selection problems in the
sense discussed here do not arise. Papers that do consider the case with heterogeneous
agents restrict the discussion to how a tournament reward structure may motivate agents to
work hard. An exception is Rosen (1986) (section V), which considers both the motivation
function and the selection function of contests. The present paper complements Rosen
(1986) in considering selection eﬃciency when risk taking rather than eﬀort is the choice
variable. Also, since Rosen confines attention to the case where there is purely public
information about types, our aim is in that sense broader in scope.
Harrington (1998, 1999) consider a promotion game where agents with the highest
output are promoted to a higher level in an organization. Harrington (1998) shows that
if agents are endowed with simple behavior rules, agents with rules that are unresponsive
to changes in the environment reach the top of the organization. Harrington (1999), on
1Baye et al. (1993) reports a related exclusion result in a complete information setup for all-pay auctions.
Auction revenue may increase if agents with high valuations are excluded.
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the other hand, allows agents to act strategically and shows that the ”rigidity” result of
Harrington (1998) can be reversed. While Harrington (1998) does not consider strategic
actions and Harrington (1999) assumes that agents are homogenous, the present paper
considers heterogenous agents that act strategically.2
The eﬃciency of various selection procedures is a main topic in the statistical decision
theory (see e.g., Gibbons et al. (1977)). By focusing on selection eﬃciency as the measure of
the success of a contest, instead of e.g., aggregate output, our work is in that sense closer
to statistical decision theory than to the tournament literature. However, the strategic
element makes the noise in the selection process we study endogenous, while the noise
in the selection processes studied by statistical decision theory is exogenous. Thus, the
statistical decision theory literature only considers statistical eﬀects, while we consider the
interaction between statistical and equilibrium eﬀects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 performs the analysis. Section 4 considers design issues, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
A principal arranges a contest in order to identify a talented agent. We assume that the
principal can only observe the rank of the agents, and awards a prize to the agent with
the highest rank, or output.3 There are n risk-neutral agents competing for the prize,
2Using tools from evolutionary game theory Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) find an evolutionary pressure
towards risk loving preferences provided that those who breed in a population is determined by a contest
(and where a child inherits the risk preferences of its parents). The focus of Dekel and Scotchmer (1999)
is very diﬀerent from our focus (there is e.g., no discussion of selection eﬃciency in Dekel and Scotchmer
(1999)), but the models applied are similar.
A patent race is a kind of contest in which there is only one prize — the patent. Selection issues in patent
races have to our knowledge not been analyzed.
3As pointed by e.g., McLaughlin (1988), cases where the principal mainly has ordinal information on
individual output, or where only ordinal information is verifiable (Malcomson (1984)), are common in
practice. If cardinal information on individual output is available and verifiable, an interesting question,
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whose value is normalized to 1. The individual output space Z consists of four elements;
Z := {z1, z2, z3, z4}, where z1 < z2 < z3 < z4 (tied winners have an equal chance of
obtaining the prize). There are two types of agents, low (l) and high (h), with θ denoting
the share of the h type in the pool from which the n agents are drawn. Both types have
an opportunity cost of participation equal to zero, and hence the group of contestants is
a true random sample from the pool. Agents of each type have two pure strategies, safe
(s) and risky (r). If an l type agent chooses s then her output is z2 with certainty. If an
h agent chooses s then her output is z3 with certainty. If a l type agent chooses r then her
output is z1 with probability 1 − x, and z4 with probability x. If an h type agent plays
r then her output is z1 with probability 1 − y, and z4 with probability y, where y > x.
We do not exclude mixed strategies, and thus the (mixed) strategy space has the usual
continuity properties. Outputs are assumed to be statistically independent. We assume
that there are no costs associated with risk taking, and hence expected utility for an agent
equals her win probability.4
Notice that the discrete output space restricts the possible risk taking, in that risk
can only be increased by putting more probability weight on the endpoints z1 and z4,
something that would not be the case with a continuous output space. In Appendix B,
we consider the case where output is normally distributed, and where agents can choose
the level of variance of their output. The results here show that our main results hold also
when the output space is continuous.
that goes beyond the aims of the present paper, is whether such cardinal information can make schemes
where the prize goes to an agent with an output in the ’middle’ optimal. (Notice that such non-monotonic
schemes have the weakness that they give agents incentives to dispose with parts of their output in
equilibrium. For example, fund managers have an incentive to inflate trading costs.)
4The case when the distribution of output under r is a mean preserving spread of the distribution of
output under s is a special case of the model.
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3 Equilibrium Analysis
We consider the incomplete information game Γ(n, θ), where an agent does not know the
type of the other contestants, but she knows n and θ and her own type. A strategy is a
mapping from the type space T , where T := {l, h}, to the action space C, where C :=
{s, r}. We denote the set of symmetric pure strategies S, where S := {(s, s), (s, r), (r, s),
(r, r)}, with the l type’s action written first. We confine our attention to symmetric Bayes-
Nash equilibria (BNE), i.e., strategy tuples where all agents maximize their probability
of winning given the strategy of the other agents, and where all agents of the same type
play the same strategy. The key endogenous variable is the probability of a h type agent
winning the prize in a BNE, denoted by Π(Γ).
3.1 Quality of Contestant Pool
To see the eﬀect of increasing the quality of the contestant pool,5 we start out by consid-
ering the case n = 2. Straightforward calculations reveal that there are unique equilibria,
and moreover that all four elements of S can be equilibrium strategies depending on the
values of the parameters (θ, x, y).
Remark 1 All four pure strategy combinations are possible symmetric BNE of Γ(2, θ).
Furthermore, if there exists a symmetric pure strategy BNE, then it is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Recall that x (y) is the probability of a l (h) agent obtaining the highest outcome if
she plays r. With both x and y large, (r, r) is the equilibrium, which is natural. In the
5For example, an investor can use a professional evaluation firm in order to hire more highly skilled
fund managers. Almost all large investors pay professional firms to evaluate fund managers (Heinkel and
Stoughton (1994)).
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case where both x and y are small, (s, s) is the equilibrium. That seems counterintuitive
since in that equilibrium a l agent loses with certainty if the other agent is a h type. The
intuition behind the (s, s) equilibrium is that the probability of a l type winning against
a h type (by playing r) is suﬃciently small for the l type to rather care about her best
chance of winning were she to play against another l type agent.6
A first guess might be that it is advantageous to improve the expected ability of the
contestants (i.e. to increase θ), as long as there are no intrinsic costs associated with
doing it. However, Proposition 1 shows that this conjecture can be false if increased
ability among the contestants induces more risk-taking.
Proposition 1 Contestant Quality.
i) In a low-quality pool a marginal increase in contestants’ average quality improves selec-
tion eﬃciency.
ii) In a medium-quality pool a marginal increase in contestants’ average quality may have
non-monotone eﬀect on selection eﬃciency.
iii) In a high-quality pool a marginal increase in contestants’ average quality improves
selection eﬃciency.
Proof. We first prove i) and iii) and then prove ii). i) From the proof of Remark 1,
we have that for θ < min [1− 2x, 2− 2y], (s, s) is a unique equilibrium strategy. As can
easily be verified, Π(s, s) = 1− (1− θ)2, increases with θ. iii) From the proof of Remark
1, we have that for θ > 1−2xy−x , (r, r) is a unique equilibrium. As can be easily verified,
Π(r, r) = θ2 + 2 (1− θ) θ ¡y (1− x) + 12xy + 12 (1− x) (1− y)¢, increases in θ. ii)We show
that if min [1− 2x, 2− 2y] < θ < 1−2xy−x , Π can decrease in θ. Consider θ = 1−2x < 2−2y.
6Of course, this equilibrium disappears as θ goes to zero.
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In this case, (s, s) is the equilibrium. A small increase in θ induces the equilibrium to
switch to (s, r), and Π decreases, as can easily be verified.
In situations in which risk taking is very attractive (case iii) or very unattractive (case
i) quality improvements would only lead a positive statistical eﬀect Π. The contestants
does not change their equilibrium strategies. In contrast, in cases in which a quality
improvement implies that contestants’ increased fear of facing a contestant of the high
ability type switch to a the high risk strategy (case ii), quality improvement may imply a
significant negative equilibrium eﬀect which exceeds the positive statistical eﬀect.7 Figure
1 illustrates the results in Proposition 1.
C
θ
A
( )ss,Π
( )sr,Π
Π
B
0θ 1θ
Fig. 1: Improved contestant quality and increased risk taking.
7 In cases in which expected output depends on the risk of the project (i.e., the non-MPS case), selection
eﬃciency as well as aggregate output may be of importance for a principal. Our analysis can straightfor-
wardly be extended to analyze the trade oﬀ between aggregate output and selection eﬃciency. Examples
in which both selection eﬃciency and aggregate output decrease in θ can easily be constructed.
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Figure 1 depicts a typical example of Π as a function of θ, given by the bold line. For
a low θ, (s, s) is the equilibrium and increases in θ only induces a statistical eﬀect on Π,
implying that Π increases with θ. For a higher θ, (r, s) is the equilibrium, and the same
argument applies. In the intermediate range, however, Π can decrease with θ due to a
negative equilibrium eﬀect. The movement A−→C is the total eﬀect on Π from increasing
θ from θ0 to θ1. The total eﬀect can be decomposed into the statistical eﬀect A−→B,
which is positive, and the equilibrium eﬀect B−→C, which is negative.
3.2 Number of Contestants
To improve Π it seems natural to increase the number of contestants in order to increase
the probability of a good agent participating.8 Proposition 2 shows that increasing com-
petition, through increasing the number of contestants, can be a two-edged sword, because
increased competition increases the equilibrium risk taking.
Proposition 2 Number of Contestants. Π may decrease when the number of contestants
increases from 2 to 3.
Proof. Note that if n = 2, θ = 12 , x =
1
5 , y =
1
4 , then from the proof of Remark 1, (s, s)
is the unique BNE. That gives Π(2, 12) = θ
2 + 2θ(1− θ) = 34 = 150200 . Now increase n to 3.
In that case, (s, s) is no longer a BNE since
UL(s, s) =
1
3
(1− 1
2
)2 =
1
12
< U 0L(s, s) =
1
5
8For example, if an investor is uncertain about the investment skill of various potential mutual fund
managers, it might be tempting to invite a large number to engage in the management of its investment
portfolio.
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However, (r, s) is indeed the BNE since a)UL(r, s) = 67300 > U
0
L(r, s) =
48
300 .While on
the other hand, b) UH(s, r) = 5321200 > U
0
H(s, r) =
319
1200 . Thus Π decreases
Π(3,
1
2
) = θ3 + 2θ2(1− θ)(1− x) + 2θ(1− θ)2(1− x)2 = 97
200
<
150
200
.
Proposition 2 shows that the increase in noise resulting from increasing n may harm
the selection eﬃciency more than the benefits of the greater likelihood of having at least
one h-type agent participating in the contest. The equilibrium eﬀect may dominate the
statistical eﬀect.9
Note also that if a switch from a safe to a risky strategy yields a suﬃciently large
reduction in expected output, an increase in the number of contestants (which induce
more risk taking) may reduce expected aggregated output.
When the number of agents is already large, then adding a player presumably has no
equilibrium eﬀect since both types play risky already. Intuitively, Π may decrease for a
small increase in n, but must increase for a large increase in n.10 But, as Proposition 3
shows, this intuition is false. The proposition builds on a useful result from Dekel and
Scotchmer (1999).
9Notice that in contrast to the case of increasing θ, the statistical eﬀect on Π of increasing n is ambiguous.
To see why, assume that the (r, s) equilibrium is played for some n. Then, keeping the strategies fixed, Π
clearly approaches zero as n increases, and thus the statistical eﬀect is negative for the (r, s) equilibrium.
On the other hand, the statistical eﬀect on Π of increasing n, given the (s, r) equilibrium, is clearly positive.
Thus the statistical eﬀect on Π of increasing n is ambiguous, since it depends on the equilibrium strategies
played.
10Notice that this intuition holds for the quality of contestants. A very high contestant pool quality (θ
close to 1) certainly gives at least as good value of Π as low values of θ.
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Proposition 3 Π may be larger for 2 contestants than for an infinite number of contes-
tants.
Proof. From Dekel and Scotchmer (1999), Proposition 3, we know that there exists a finite
n, denoted n*, such that for all n larger than n∗, (r, r) is the unique equilibrium. It follows
that (r, r) is the only equilibrium for an infinite number of contestants. Consequently, with
an infinite number of contestants, the winner has output equal to z4, with probability 1.
By the law of large numbers, the share of h agents that achieve z4 is just y, and the share
of l agents that achieve z4 is equal to x. Thus Π(∞) = θy
θy + (1− θ)x . Now consider
θ = 12 , x =
1
5 , y =
1
4 . With those parameter values, we have Π(∞) = 59 < 34 = Π(2).
To sum up, we have shown that Π can be non-monotone in n and in θ, due to the
equilibrium eﬀect of increases in n or θ. These results were shown for n = 2, and where
merely examples. Since the non-monotonicity in θ is the most surprising result, we would
like to generalize it. In the following we show that non-monotonicity of Π(θ) holds for all
n.
Proposition 4 For all n and θ there exists (x,y) such that Π is non-monotonic in θ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result generalizes the insight from the examples, by showing that non-monotonicity
can occur for all n and θ. This is a rather strong possibility result, but is mute on the
magnitude of non-monotonicity. We now use numerical analysis to assess how large the
downward movement in Π associated with increases in θ (and consequent shift of equilib-
rium) can be.11
11The program generating the numbers in the table is available from the authors.
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n θ0 θ1 yl(θ0) Π(θ0) Π(θ1) Π(θ1)−Π(θ0)
2 .25 .25 .87 .44 .39 -.05
3 .25 .28 .77 .58 .51 -.07
4 .25 .30 .68 .68 .60 -.08
5 .25 .33 .61 .76 .67 -.09
10 .25 .45 .38 .94 .84 -.10
20 .25 .65 .20 1.0 .94 -.06
Table 1: Reduction in selection eﬃciency (Π) when θ increases from θ0 to θ1.
In a row, the first two columns are our choices of n and θ0. yl(θ0) is the highest
y that is consistent with (s, s) being an equilibrium given n and θ0. Π(θ0) is equal to
Π(s, s) computed for (x = 0, y = yl(θ0), θ0). The column θ1 is the smallest θ that
makes (s, r) an equilibrium, given that (x = 0, y = yl(θ0)). Π(θ1) is Π(s, r) computed for
(x = 0, y = yl(θ0), θ1). Notice that Π(θ1)−Π(θ0) is negative for all the (n,θ0) combinations
in the table even if θ increases significantly in some of the cases.12
4 Design Issues
In this section we discuss whether a principal can modify the contest to solve the selection
problem. We consider two possible modifications. First, we consider the case where the
principal constructs several diﬀerent contests, to induce agents of diﬀerent types to self-
select into diﬀerent contests, and hence solve the selection problem right away.13 Second we
12 It can be noted that since we compute Π(θ1)−Π(θ0) for an increase in θ that is just suﬃcient to make
(s, r) an equilibrium, the computed Π(θ1) − Π(θ0) is an upper bound on the magnitude of the reduction
in Π from an increase in θ that induces a switch in pure equilibria.
13The classic paper in the tournament literature, Lazear and Rosen (1981), also considers the possibility
of multiple contests. Their purpose is to study how multiple contests can generate eﬃcient levels of eﬀort.
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consider that the principal limits attention the competition to one contest, but increases
the number of prices, in order to reduce the amount of risk taking in the contest.
4.1 Multiple Contests
For illustration, we confer to discuss implementation in the n = 2 game. We ask under
what conditions constructing two contests can make agents of diﬀerent types voluntarily
choose diﬀerent contests, and hence solve the self-selection problem directly.14
Suppose that the principal lets each agent decide whether to enter either contest 1 or
contest 2. The principal sets the prizes in the contests to C1 and C2, respectively. After
choosing which contest to enter, the agent observes whether there is a rival in the contest
and of which type the rival is. Thereafter the agent chooses to play r or s. Since an agent
in a contest can observe the rival’s type he can also detect a rival’s deviation from the ”self-
selection-equilibrium” before r or s is chosen. By allowing agents to respond to deviations
from the ”self-selection-equilibrium” we make deviating less attractive and self-selection
easier to achieve.15 Since only the ratio between C1 and C2 matters for equilibrium, we
can restrict attention to considering ζ, where ζ =
C1
C2
and ζ ∈ [0, 1], and consider ζ as the
only choice variable of the principal. Consider the case in which h agents self-select into
contest 1 and l agents self-select into contest 2.
In a contest in which a h type faces competition from a l type, (s, r) is the equilibrium
strategies if (1 − x) ≥ y and (r, r) if the converse holds. we focus on the low risk (s, r)
equilibrium in case one of the types deviate from intended contest (i.e. (1− x) ≥ y).
14When there are more types T than two, implementation is generally made more diﬃcult, since there
will be T (T −1) incentive restrictions to take care of, instead of only 2. We therefore consider a case when
implementation should be relatively simple.
15 Since deviating from the self-selection equilibrium is more attractive when a rival cannot observe the
type of the other agents entering the same contest, it is straightforward to show that also in this case
self-selection can be achieved only for a limited set of parameter values.
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Remark 2 For θ suﬃciently high, self-selection is not feasible.
Proof. Self-selection can only be achieved if the following two conditions hold (none of
the types will deviate from the ”correct” contest)
h type :
·
1
2
θ + (1− θ)
¸
C1 ≥ [θ + (1− θ) (1− x)]C2
l type :
·
1
2
(1− θ) + θ
¸
C2 ≥ [(1− θ) + θx]C1
Both conditions holds only if θ ∈
h
1
2(1−2x)
³
5− 2x−p(17− 4x+ 4x2)´ , 1i (since the h
type chooses strategy s, y does not enter into the condition).
The intuition for the result is as follows. For low θ the l type will be tempted to choose
the contest for the h type since it is a low probability for facing a h type in that contest.
Moreover, the principal cannot reduce the prize in the h contest since this will induce a
potential h type to choose the l contest.
This result is related to Lazear and Rosen (1981). They study ”eﬀort” contests and
show that a principal arranging a contest with homogenous agents can induce eﬃcient
eﬀort. They extend their analysis to heterogenous agents and study whether self-selection
into diﬀerent contest can ensure that eﬃcient eﬀort still can be induced. In line with our
analysis they show that self-selection cannot be achieved.
4.2 Multiple Prizes
In some cases, it is possible for the principal to increase the number of prizes, to avoid the
risk taking problems outlined. The idea behind increasing the number of prizes is to make
the prize structure less convex, and hence decrease the amount risk taking and make the
ranking of agents more informative. There is a trivial sense in which this can be obtained,
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as shown in the following remark.
Remark 3 Suppose there are n participants in the contest, and that the prize structure
is (1/n, 1/n, ..., 1/n). Then Π = 1 in equilibrium
Proof. Since the agents face no incentives at all, it is trivial to see that (s,s) is indeed
an equilibrium, and hence the agents reveal their type.
A practical problem with increasing the number of prizes is financial constraints. For
example, in the race between vice presidents to become the CEO of a firm, it may put a
harsh financial strain on the firm to pay the runner up a wage that is close to the CEO
wage. Another problem with increasing the number of prizes is that eﬀort may decrease:
A central insight from the eﬀort strand of the tournament theory is that equilibrium eﬀort
is an increasing function of the prize spread (see Lazear and Rosen (1981)). Hence the
direct eﬀects of increasing the number of prizes could be to imply less risk taking, but
also less eﬀort, and the optimal number of prizes would involve some trade-oﬀ between
these two eﬀects.16 A third problem with increasing the number of prizes arises if the h
type agents have higher participation constraints than the l type agents. In the context
of a one-prize contest, there is no tension between selection eﬃciency and participation
constraints since in any (symmetric) equilibrium, selection eﬃciency and the utility of a
h type agent will be in a one-to-one relation. However, with more than one prize, this
relation breaks down, because although the selection eﬃciency can increase, the expected
payments to an agent of the h type can decrease. This point can easily be seen from the
following example.
Example 2
16The trade-oﬀ is complicated by the fact that the indirect eﬀect of less risk taking on eﬀort would be
to increase eﬀort (see Lazear and Rosen (1981)).
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Suppose n = 2, and it is common knowledge between the contestants and the principal
that only one of the agents is the h type. Each contestant knows his own type. Furthermore
assume that x = 1/2 and y = 3/4. With the price structure (1, 0), the unique equilibrium
induces both agents to play r, and Π = UH = 11/16. Suppose now that the prize structure
is altered to (1/2, 1/2). Then, by indiﬀerence, (s, s) is an equilibrium and Π = 1. However,
with the latter prize structure, UH = 1/2 < 11/16. Hence if the participation constraint
is between 1/2 and 11/16, the h agent will not participate.
5 Conclusion
Contests are used both to induce agents to work hard and to solve selection problems.
It is therefore surprising that the tournament literature has almost exclusively considered
the former function. In this paper, however, we have mainly considered how well contests
select talented agents when risk taking is the decision variable of the agents.
We have used promotion decisions in firms and the selection of mutual fund managers
as examples of situations where fiercer competition may lead to more risk taking and
reduced selection eﬃciency. However, the insights from our analysis can be applied to other
contexts also. For instance, governments and private firms often sponsor tournaments to
induce research on specific topics. The reward structure and selection issues of these
tournaments is close to what we have discussed in this paper: there is usually only one
large prize and selection of a high-quality firm is essential since the winner is going to
take care of prospective production. Our results indicate that an organizer of a research
tournament may want to restrict the number and quality of contestants in a research
tournament.
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We have two main results. We show that although increasing the number of firms
participating in a contest makes it more likely that the pool of contestants includes a
high-quality firm, it might make it less likely that a high-quality firm will be awarded the
prize. We also show that an increase in the expected ability or quality of the contestants
may make it less likely that a high-quality firm will be selected. The intuition behind
the results is that a more competitive tournament — more contestants or higher expected
abilities among the contestants — induces firms to adopt riskier strategies, which may harm
the selection of high-quality firms. Riskier projects create more noise in the selection
contest, and thereby reduce the informativeness of the rank.
6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Remark 1: We use the following convention: Ui(j, k) denotes the win probability
of an agent of type i when agents of her own type (including herself) play strategy j and
agents of the other type play strategy k. For example, UH(s, r) denotes the win probability
of an h agent when all h agents (including herself) play s, and all l agents play r. The
individual payoﬀs in the symmetric tuples (when all agents of the same type choose the
same strategies) are:
UH(r, r) =
1
2(1+ (1− θ)(y − x)) UL(r, r) = 12(1+ θx− θy)
UH(s, r) = 1− 12θ − x+ θx UL(s, r) = 12(1+ θ)− θy
UH(r, s) =
1
2θ + (1− θ)y UL(r, s) = 12(1− θ) + xθ
UH(s, s) = 1− 12θ UL(s, s) = 12(1− θ)
For individual deviations, we use the following convention: U 0i(j, k) denotes the win
probability of an agent of type i when she plays strategy −j, other agents of her own type
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play strategy j, and agents of the other type play strategy k. Since the payoﬀ from letting
−j be a mixed strategy is a convex combination of playing s and playing r, we only need
to consider pure strategy deviations . For example, U 0H(s, r) denotes the win probability
of an h agent playing r, when all other h agents play s, and all l agents play r. The
individual payoﬀs from individual deviation are:
U 0H(r, r) = θ(1− y) + (1− θ)(1− x)
U 0H(s, r) = θy + (1− θ)(12xy + y(1− x) + 12(1− x)(1− y))
U 0H(r, s) = θ(1− y) + (1− θ)
U 0H(s, s) = y
U 0L(r, r) = θ(1− y) + (1− θ)(1− x)
U 0L(s, r) = θ(
1
2xy + x(1− y) + 12(1− x)(1− y)) + (1− θ)x
U 0L(r, s) = (1− θ)(1− x)
U 0L(s, s) = x
First consider equilibrium (r, r). Notice that the payoﬀ from individual deviation is the
same for an h agent and an l agent, and moreover that UH(r, r) > UL(r, r). Thus we only
have to check a deviation from an l agent. An l agent follows the supposed equilibrium
strategy if 12(1 − θy + θx) > θ(1 − y) + (1 − θ)(1 − x), which implies that y > 1+θx−2xθ .
Now consider equilibrium (s, s). An l agent follows the supposed equilibrium strategy if
x < 12(1− θ). The condition for an h agent is y < 1− 12θ. Now consider equilibrium (r, s).
An l agent follows the supposed equilibrium strategy if 12(1−θ)+xθ > (1−θ)(1−x), which
implies that x > 12(1−θ). The condition for the h type is 12(1+(1−θ)(y−x)) > θy+(1−
θ)(12xy+y(1−x)+ 12(1−x)(1−y)), which implies that y < 12 . Finally, consider equilibrium
(s, r). An l agent sticks if 12(1+θ)−θy > θ(12xy+x(1−y)+ 12(1−x)(1−y))+(1−θ)x, which
implies that x < 1−θy2−θ . The condition for the h type is
1
2θ+ (1− θ)y > θ(1− y) + (1− θ),
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which implies that y > 1 − 12θ. The uniqueness of BNE, given (x, y, θ), follows directly
from the argument.
Proof of Proposition 4: The idea of the proof is to consider a small increase in θ that
induces equilibrium to switch from (s, s) to a mixed strategy equilibrium, and to show
that the total eﬀect on Π from increasing θ is negative. To limit the equilibrium eﬀects
to changes in the strategy of h agents, we assume for convenience that x = 0, so that s is
a dominating strategy for the l agents. Suppose that the h agents play r with probability
α, and s with probability (1-α). If α is played,
Π (θ,α) = 1−
n−1X
m=0
(α (1− y))m θm (1− θ)n−m
µ
n
m
¶
(1)
where the second expression on the right is the probability that an l agent wins the contest
given that α is played, and where y is fixed. The event that an l agent wins occurs only
when all m agents of the h type obtain z1 (which occurs with probability (1 − y)mαm).
Equation (1) is clearly diﬀerentiable, and provided that ∂α(θ,y)∂θ exists, increasing θ has a
direct and an indirect eﬀect on Π,
dΠ
dθ
=
∂Π
∂θ
+
∂Π
∂α
∂α
∂θ
(2)
The first term on the right side is the statistical eﬀect of increasing θ and the second term
is the equilibrium eﬀect. We wish to show that that dΠdθ < 0 for a suitably defined value
of y, which implies that Π is non-monotone on some interval of θ.
Denote by U iH (s,α) [U
i
H (r,α)] the utility of an h agent playing s [r], given that the
other h agents play r with probability α, and s with probability (1-α). Let the probability
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of there being m agents of the h type given that there are n− 1 agents participating be
denoted by Ψ, where Ψ =
¡n−1
m
¢
θm (1− θ)n−1−m. Then,
U iH (s,α) =
n−1X
m=0
Ã
mX
k=0
¡m
k
¢
(1− y)m−k (1− α)k αm−k
k + 1
!
Ψ (3)
By playing s, the agent will beat all l agents, but can only win if all the h agents playing
r obtain z1. Moreover, k is the number of other h agents that play s and (m− k) is the
number of h agents that play r.
U iH (r,α) = (1− y)
θn−1 (α (1− y))n−1
n
+ y
n−1X
m=0
(
mX
k=0
¡
m
k
¢
(αy)k (1− αy)m−k
k + 1
)Ψ (4)
The first term on the right side is the win probability conditional on obtaining z1 and the
second term is the win probability conditional on obtaining z4. Moreover, k is the number
of other h agents that obtain z4. The mixed strategy α is an equilibrium if
F ≡ U iH (s,α)− U iH (r,α) = 0 (5)
Equation (5) determines implicitly a function α(θ, y(θ)). Now define yl as the value of
y that makes an h agent indiﬀerent between playing s and r, given that all the other h
agents play s. In other words, yl := sup(y : (s, s) ∈ NE). We suppress notation by simply
writing α instead of α(θ, y(θ)).
yl = {y : U iH (s,α)α=0 = U iH (r,α)α=0} = {y :
n−1X
m=0
Ψ
m+ 1
= y} = (6)
n−1X
m=0
Ψ
m+ 1
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Notice that by construction, α(θ, yl(θ)) = 0, which will be several times later. The strategy
now is to find the derivatives on the right hand side of equation (2), and to evaluate
at y = yl, where the α-terms drop. We begin by deriving ∂α(θ,y)∂θ y=yl and then derive
∂Π(θ,α)
∂θ y=yl
and ∂Π(θ,α)∂α y=yl .
F = U iH (s,α)− U iH (r,α)
=
n−1X
m=0
Ã
mX
k=0
¡m
k
¢
(1− y)m−k (1− α)k αm−k
k + 1
!
Ψ
−(1− y) θ
n−1 (α (1− y))n−1
n
−y
n−1X
m=0
(
mX
k=0
¡m
k
¢
(αy)k (1− αy)m−k
k + 1
)Ψ (7)
To find ∂α(θ,y)∂θ y=yl we use the implicit function theorem, i.e.,
∂α
∂θ = −FθFα , and then evaluate
at y = yl. First find Fα =
∂U iH(s,α)
∂α −
∂U iH(r,α)
∂α .
∂U iH (s,α)
∂α
=
n−1X
m=0
 mX
k=0
¡
m
k
¢
(1− y)m−k
³
(m− k)αm−k−1 (1− α)k − k (1− α)k−1 αm−k
´
k + 1
Ψ
(8)
When y = yl, the inner sum is zero except for at k = m− 1 and at k = m. Therefore,
∂U iH (s,α)
∂α y=yl
=
n−1X
m=0
"¡ m
m−1
¢ ¡
1− yl¢ (1)
m
+
¡
m
m
¢
(−m)
m+ 1
#
Ψ
=
n−1X
m=1
m
¡
1− yl¢
m
Ψ−
n−1X
m=0
mΨ
m+ 1
=
n−1X
m=1
³
1− yl
´
Ψ−
n−1X
m=0
mΨ
m+ 1
(9)
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Moreover,
∂U iH (r,α)
∂α
=
(1− y) θn−1(n− 1)(1− y) (α (1− y))n−2
n
+
y
n−1X
m=0
(
mX
k=0
¡m
k
¢
ky (αy)k−1 (1− αy)m−k
k + 1
−¡m
k
¢
(αy)k (m− k)y (1− αy)m−k−1
k + 1
)Ψ (10)
For y = yl, the first term drops, since n > 2. The inside sum in the second term drops
except for at k = 1 and at k = 0. Hence we have,
∂U iH (r,α)
∂α y=yl
= yl
n−1X
m=0
Ã¡m
1
¢
yl
2
−
¡m
0
¢
myl
1
!
Ψ
= yl
n−1X
m=0
µ
myl
2
−myl
¶
Ψ = −(yl)2
n−1X
m=0
mΨ
2
= −(n− 1)
2
θ(yl)2 (11)
And moreover,
Fα|y=yl =
n−1X
m=1
³
1− yl
´
Ψ−
n−1X
m=1
mΨ
m+ 1
+
n− 1
2
θ(yl)2 (12)
Now find Fθ =
∂U iH(s,α)
∂θ −
∂U iH(r,α)
∂θ . Define Φ =
Pn
k=0
(mk )(1−y)m−k(1−α)kαm−k
k+1 , which is
independent of θ, and notice that Φy=yl =
1
m+1 . Hence,
∂U iH (s,α)
∂θ y=yl
=
n−1X
m=0
(Φ
∂Ψ
∂θ
)y=yl =
n−1X
m=0
1
m+ 1
∂Ψ
∂θ y=yl
(13)
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Furthermore, we have that,
∂U iH (r,α)
∂θ
=
(1− y) (n− 1) θn−2 (α (1− y))n−1
n
− y
n−1X
m=0
Ã
mX
k=0
µ
m
k
¶
(αy)k (1− αy)m−k
!
∂Ψ
∂θ
(14)
Notice that for y = yl, the first term on the right hand side is zero for n > 1. FurthermorePn−1
m=0
∂Ψ
∂θ = 0 since
Pn−1
m=0Ψ = 1, which implies that also the second term drops, since
the term inside the brackets just equals 1. Hence we have that,
∂U iH (r,α)
∂θ y=yl
= 0 (15)
It follows that Fθ|y=yl =
Pn−1
m=0
∂Ψ
∂θ
m+1 . Hence we get,
∂α
∂θ y=yl
= −Fθ
Fα y=yl
= −
Pn−1
m=0
∂Ψ
∂θ
m+1Pn−1
m=1 (1− yl)Ψ−
Pn−1
m=1
mΨ
m+1 +
n−1
2 θ(y
l)2
(16)
where Fα|y=yl > 0. Now find ∂Π∂θ y=yl .
∂Π
∂θ
= −
n−1X
m=0
µ
n
m
¶
(α (1− y))m θm (1− θ)n−m (17)
Substituting for y = yl, we have that α = 0 and all terms drop except for at m = 0,
∂Π
∂θ y=yl
= −
µ
n
0
¶³
−nθ (1− θ)n−1−0
´
= n (1− θ)n−1 (18)
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Now find ∂Π∂α y=yl .
∂Π
∂α
= −
n−1X
m=0
µ
n
m
¶
θm (1− θ)n−mm (α (1− y))m−1 (1− y) (19)
For y = yl, all terms drop except for at m = 1,
∂Π
∂α y=yl
= −
µ
n
1
¶
θ (1− θ)n−1 (1− yl) = −nθ (1− θ)n−1
³
1− yl
´
(20)
Hence for y = yl, we get that,
dΠ
dθ y=yl
= n (1− θ)n−1 + nθ (1− θ)
n−1 (1− yl)Pn−1m=0 ∂Ψ∂θm+1Pn−1
m=1 (1− yl)Ψ−
Pn−1
m=1
mΨ
m+1 +
n−1
2 θ(y
l)2
(21)
To show that non-monotonicity is possible for all n and θ, we need to show that this
expression is negative. Hence dΠdθ y=yl < 0 if,
Λ = (1− yl)θ
n−1X
m=0
∂Ψ
∂θ
m+ 1
+
n−1X
m=1
³
1− yl
´
Ψ−
n−1X
m=1
mΨ
m+ 1
+
n− 1
2
θ(yl)2 < 0 (22)
By standard summation rules, we can simplify this expression, observing that,
yl =
n−1X
m=0
Ψ
m+ 1
=
1− (1− θ)n
nθ
n−1X
m=1
mΨ
m+ 1
=
θn− 1+ (1− θ)n
nθ
= 1− yl
∂yl
∂θ
=
(1− θ)n−1(nθ + 1− θ)− 1
θ2n
(23)
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Using eq. (23) and simplifying we obtain,
Λ =
2− θ(1+ n) + (1− θ)n[(1− θ)n(nθ + 2− θ)− 2(2− θ)]
(nθ)2
(24)
It suﬃces to show that the top of this expression, labeled Λ1, is always negative. Suppose
that
∂Λ1
∂n
< 0. It then suﬃces to show that Λ1(n = 2) < 0. But, as can easily be verified,
Λ1(n = 2) = −θ4(2− θ) < 0. It then only remains to show that is negative. As can easily
be verified,
∂Λ1
∂n
, is negative
1
θ
∂Λ1
∂n
= −1+ (1− θ)2n[ln(1− θ) + 1] (25)
Notice that if the expression on the right should be positive for any value of n, it must
be positive for n = 1 (since if the second term on the right hand side is positive, it is
decreasingly so in n). However, substituting in for n = 1 it can easily be verified that the
right hand side of (25) is negative. Hence
∂Λ1
∂n
< 0. That completes the proof.
7 Appendix B: Numerical Analysis
The discrete output space, {z1, z2, z3, z4}, places tight restrictions on the type of risk
taking allowed. Specifically, the only way for an agent to increase risk is by putting more
probability weight on the endpoints z1 and z4. With a continuous output space, say the
interval [z1, z4], increased risk does not necessarily imply more weight at the endpoints. In
this appendix we use simulation techniques to consider the case with a continuous output
space and three diﬀerent ability levels: High (H), Medium (M), and Low (L). The results
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of this section show that our main results also hold when the output space is continuous.17
As before, the agents maximize the probability of being selected by choosing between
safe and risky projects. To conduct the simulation analysis we make the following assump-
tions.
1. The outcomes of the agents’ projects are normally distributed with expected out-
comes L = 0, M = 3 or H = 6.
2. The agents choose between a safe and a risky project with the same expected out-
come. The safe project is assumed to have a standard deviation of 1. The risky
project has a standard deviation of σ, where σ ∈ [3, 7].
3. The probability of being of a particular type is:
L M H
Probability 12 − θ 12 θ
An increase in θ implies that it is more likely for any agent to meet an opponent
with high ability.
7.1 Quality of the Contestants
In this section we show that Π may decrease with an increase in the quality of the contes-
tants (θ).
Consider the case with two contestants. It is simple to verify that there exists an
equilibrium in dominant strategies where the H type always chooses a safe strategy and
17The MapleV programs used in this section can be obtained from the authors. We have experimented
with diﬀerent parameter values and obtained similar results, so the results seem robust.
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the L type always chooses a risky strategy.18 Let us now focus on the M type. If θ is
small, then the likelihood of facing a better contestant is small and theM type behaves as
if she is best and, hence, chooses the safe strategy. But if θ is high then theM type is more
likely to face a better contestant and, hence, chooses the risky strategy. In Figure B-1,
the curve G shows the critical values for θ, such that the M type is indiﬀerent between
choosing a safe and a risky strategy.
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Figure B-1: Higher quality (θ) of contestants
The shaded area represents the possibility that an increase in θ reduces Π. Moving
northwards from a point on the G line into the shaded area, causes a decrease in Π.
To illustrate further, take two points on the diagram and label them A and B. Then Π
18To see why, first note that for type L the high risk strategy dominates the low risk strategy. If she is
facing a better type, she will always increase her probability of winning by choosing the riskier strategy.
If she is facing another L type she is indiﬀerent about the choice between a high and low risk strategy.
Hence, a high risk strategy is a dominant strategy for the L type. Second, note that the low risk strategy
is the dominant strategy for the H type. A high risk strategy will increase the probability of low outputs
and hence increase the likelihood of less able contestants achieving a higher output. Furthermore, the H
type will be indiﬀerent to the choice between low and high risk strategy facing another H type.
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increases from A to B if B lies further north than A, as long as we do not cross the G line.
If A is below the G line and B is above, as illustrated in Figure 2, then Π may decrease.
An increase in the quality of the contestants makes it more likely that one of the
contestants is a H type. But higher quality induce theM types to choose a risky strategy,
which may decrease Π.
7.2 Number of Contestants
In this section we illustrate that Π may decrease as a result of adding one contestant
to a group of two contestants. For simplicity, we focus on the case in which adding a
contestant induces the M type to change strategy, but not the L type or the H type. It
is straightforward to show that (risky, risky, safe)n=3 is a unique equilibrium for θ < 15 ,
which is the case we consider in the following figure.
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Figure B-2: Adding one more contestant
In Figure B-2, the line P gives the points where Π is identical for n = 2 and n = 3.
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In the shaded area of Figure B-2, Π decreases when the number of contestants increases
from two to three.
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